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WHEN IMAGES MATTER 
Internet child pornography, forms of observation and an ethics 
of the virtual  
 
David Oswell 
 
NB This version of the paper is prior to final corrections. Please use the published version for 
quotes/referencing: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~db=all~content=a746020236 
Abstract 
The arrest of Peter Townshend, once lead guitarist for The Who, for downloading and 
possessing Internet child pornography and the publicity surrounding the case provides an 
initial point of discussion concerning the emergence of an ethics of the image that is not 
predicated on the actual evidential status of that image but on more virtual forms of 
observation. The discussion in this article focuses on three substantive aspects of this 
event – legislation in the UK and the US, expert psychological discourse, and public 
discussion in the UK press – in order to present a particular and situated rendering of 
forms of virtual observation. The context to this discussion concerns the notion that digital 
imaging technology presages a need for new legislation, law enforcement and social 
analytical frameworks for understanding and tackling the production, distribution and 
consumption of images of child sexual abuse.  
 
Keywords Internet child pornography; actual and virtual; ethics; 26 forms of observation; 
regulation; digital imaging technology; witnessing  
 
Introduction  
In 1999 a postal inspector in Minnesota, in the US, uncovered the operations of Landslide 
Productions run by Thomas Reedy, a computer consultant, and his wife, Janice Reedy. A 
website from Texas provided access to a network of 5700 child pornographic sites, mainly 
based in Russia and Indonesia. The network covered over 60 countries across three 
continents, with 250,000 subscribers, making the couple over US$1 million a month. US 
law enforcement agencies in an investigation entitled Operation Avalanche were able to 
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bring the pair to trial and gain a conviction. In 2002 these agencies passed to the UK 
National Crime Squad and the National Criminal Intelligence Service names of about 7000 
UK residents who had paid via credit card to access the network of sites. Most of the 
names were male and many on the list had no previous criminal convictions. Operation 
Ore was initiated and was at that time the largest UK police investigation into internet child 
pornography.[1] By January 2003 1300 people had been arrested, including magistrates, 
hospi-tal consultants, teachers and police officers.  
 
On Saturday 11 January 2003, the UK press had got wind of a story concerning a  
well-known, but as yet unnamed, popular musician downloading child pornography from 
the Internet. The Daily Mail had been leaked the story by a police officer and had placed 
the news on its front page. On Sunday 12 January various newspapers reported that a 
well-known musician was under investigation. By Monday the Sun newspaper had gained 
an interview with the musician and was able to disclose on its front page, and at this time 
along with other newspapers, that Pete Townshend, once lead guitarist for The Who, had 
been brought in for questioning at Twickenham police station, West London. In a public 
statement Townshend revealed that he had come across some child pornography while 
surfing the Internet with his teenage son. Townshend claimed that on another occasion he 
had searched for information about a television documentary and had come across a list 
of child pornographic websites. He claimed that he only visited three or four sites and only 
used his credit card to access one particular site on one occasion. Throughout the case 
Townshend claimed that he had looked at the offending material in the interests of 
research for a book on child sexual abuse and Internet child pornography.  
 
On Monday 13 January, Townshend was arrested under the terms of the Protection of 
Children Act 1978 on suspicion of making and possessing inde-cent images of children 
and of inciting others to distribute indecent images, but was shortly released on bail.[2] 
The UK press over these few days released reports of other public figures (a public school 
teacher, a local government official and a deputy prison governor) being investigated 
under Operation Ore and engaged in a widespread discussion of the issues of the case. 
On 7 May 2003 Townshend was cautioned by the police and placed on the sex offen-ders’ 
register for five years. Although child abuse campaigners condemned the leniency of the 
punishment (Guardian, 8 May 2003), Townshend escaped the possibility of a drawn-out 
publicly aired trial, and law enforcement agencies were saved from a possible defeat and 
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the prospect of ‘research’ being seen by members of the public as a legitimate defence 
with regard to downloading child pornography from the Internet.[3]  
 
I consider this event in terms of the emergence of a form of ethics of the image, an ethics 
of virtual observation. Rather than drawing out the ‘virtual’ from some of the more obvious 
works in the field (Deleuze 1988, 1994; Castells 1996; Levy 1996, 2001; Bergson 
2004/1910) and mapping a resemblance between the theoretical and the empirical, my 
discussion focuses on three substantive aspects of this event concerning Internet child 
pornography – legislation in the UK and the US, expert psychological discourse, and 
public discussion in the UK press – in order to present a particular and more situated 
rendering of forms of virtual observation. The context to this discussion concerns the 
notion that digital imaging technology presages a need for new legislation, law 
enforcement and social analytical frameworks for understanding and tackling the 
production, distribution and consumption of images of child sexual abuse (cf. Akdeniz 
1997; Oswell 1998, 1999). Central to my argument in this paper is that the construction of 
Internet child pornographic images as cultural artefacts and objects of concern has less to 
do with the actual evidential status of these images and more with the configuration of 
forms of observation that disclose the relations between scene of crime, image and user 
(creator, downloader, viewer) in terms of their virtuality. Forms of observation are split 
along lines of legality and illegality, normality and the pathology, and righteousness and 
condemnation.  
 
The indecent photograph as cultural artefact 
Although one might doubt its veridicality, research suggests that until the late 1960s it was 
rare to find children in pornographic material but by the late 1970s the market for this 
material had grown substantially and legislation has correspondingly been introduced to 
tackle the problem in a number of countries across the world.[4] The question of how to 
define ‘child pornography’, though, is less than clear cut. For example, different national 
and regional jurisdictions contain different ages of sexual maturity, different cultural 
notions of what constitutes an obscenity (or an image or text that might be seen to 
constitute an offence to the wider community) and different ways of framing the relation 
between legality and illegality. Agreement of definition across nation-states emerges 
within the context of supra-national agencies such as the Council of Europe, which defines 
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child pornography as ‘any audiovisual material which uses children in a sexual context’ 
(1993) or the International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL), which defines it as 
‘the visual depiction of the sexual exploi-tation of a child, focusing on the child’s sexual 
behaviour or genitals’ (1995 ) (cf. Healy 1996).  
 
Since the mid-1970s in the US, the UK and elsewhere an understanding of child 
pornography as the record of actual child sexual abuse has emerged and become widely 
used in legal discourse and the public discourse of law enforcement agencies and child 
protection charities: ‘[e]ach video or photograph records a criminal offence against a child’ 
(Williams 1991, p. 88). The indecent photograph is seen to document an event, is seen to 
be transparent, and, in this sense, is no different from a family snapshot or a press 
photograph. Supposedly, the photograph says no more than the world it captures, ‘a 
message without a code’ (Barthes 1977/1961, p. 17). But the indecent photograph is not 
simply constructed as a recording of the real. It is also figured in terms of the subjectivity 
of the spectator, or more accurately the observer, in that it brings about: ‘[t]he type of 
consciousness the photograph involves is indeed truly unprecedented, since it establishes 
not a consciousness of the being-there of the thing (which any copy could produce) but an 
awareness of its having-been-there’ (Barthes 1977/1964, p.44).5 This is not the place to 
review older debates about photographic realism, but claims regarding the affordances of 
new digital imaging tech-nologies have questioned the referential status of the photograph 
and corre-sponding forms of observation. William Mitchell, in his discussion of the 
difference between ‘traditional’ photography and digital imaging technol-ogies, talks about 
how a photograph constitutes a positionality for the witness; it frames the spatial and 
temporal coordinates of the witness of the event: ‘[p]hotographs like those of Cartier-
Bresson make us catch our breath in amazement that the photographer was there, that he 
actually saw it, that he somehow seized the instant and framed the action’ (Mitchell 1992, 
p. 188). In contrast, digital photography is seen to create ‘an ontological aneurism – a 
blowout in the barrier separating visual fact and fancy’; it is seen to constitute ‘an 
electronically assembled event [that] has ascertainable coordinates, and there is no flesh-
and-blood photographer – alive or dead – to find’ (ibid., p. 189). Mitchell has declared that 
‘[t]oday, as we enter the post-photographic era, we must face once again the ineradicable 
fragility of our ontological distinctions between the imaginary and the real, and the tragic 
elusiveness of the Cartesian dream’ (ibid., p. 225). Accordingly, the disturbance of this 
dream is seen to impact not just on the classical table and grid through which the image 
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records the real as ordered, but also on the positionality of the witness. The singular apex 
through which the observer had a vantage on the ordering of the real is certainly 
problematized. But much of this discussion has been framed in terms of an opposition 
between ‘new’ and ‘old’ technology. Kevin Robins has shown that ‘old technologies 
(chemical and optical) have come to seem restrictive and impoverished, whilst the new 
electronic technologies promise to inau-gurate an era of almost unbounded freedom and 
flexibility in the creation of images’ (Robins 1995, p. 30). A number of contemporary 
critics, Robins included, have argued that this opposition is far from credible and that 
many of the features attributed to digital imaging technologies in fact have a longer 
lineage than is often credited (Lister 1995; Manovich 1995, 2001). Genealogies of 
perception, technologies of vision and classification are altogether more contingent in their 
historical connections (Foster 1988; Crary 1992).  
 
Nevertheless, such claims concerning the affordances of digital imaging technologies 
frame many public responses to the issue of Internet child pornography. Zoe. Williams, in 
her article ‘Panic on the screens’ for the Guardian, states:  
 
If ...it’s [an image of child sexual abuse] all photoshopped, then although it remains very 
unpleasant, it’s nevertheless victimless.... But the tech-nological advances of photography have 
effectively nixed its legitimacy as proof of reality; a photo is no more necessarily true now than a 
painting is. To become inflamed by images whose truth content is open to question seems 
irrational. (Williams 2003 ) 
 
 
Williams distinguishes between ‘photographs’ that record an event and those that produce 
an event as if it were real. Moreover, she argues that any ethical response is dependent 
on the ontological status of that which is represented (and on the evidential or 
epistemological status of the photograph) such that the ethical response is one predicated 
on reason. The implications of her argument are twofold: that ethics is a rational enterprise 
and that child pornographic images that are produced ex nihilo through digital technology 
do not warrant an ethical response any more than a cartoon image of a wily coyote being 
flattened by an anvil. To some extent Williams’s deflation of the status of the photographic 
image in the social epistemology of child sexual abuse and the equivalent deflation of this 
object’s ethical value can be aligned with other commentaries that see Internet child 
pornography as a highly mediatized issue in which the scene of abuse circulates only as a 
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figural, de-objectified, entity.  
 
There are those who are critical of public discourse around child sexual abuse and even 
more so of public concern over Internet child pornography. In the liberal (even libertarian) 
balancing of rights and liberties, crimes against the child (as they are with women and 
people of colour) are often given lower value than, for example, crimes against property. 
The Daily Telegraph in its editorial column on 15 January made this clear:  
Nobody denies that the sexual abuse of children is a revolting crime, or that those who ply for child 
pornography encourage that abuse. But many may think that, while burglaries and muggings are 
on the increase, the police have more pressing work to do than hunting for those who surf the 
Internet in search of filth.  
 
Public discussion of child sexual abuse is seen to articulate a broader mediatized 
therapeutic culture. Mick Hume, in a piece entitled ‘Scratch a rock star, and you’re sure to 
find a victim trying to get out’ for his column in The Times, wrote: ‘[w]hen the news 
headlines bizarrely announced that “Pete Townshend says he is not a paedophile”, my 
first reaction was to wonder if there was anything sad celebrities would not do to get their 
picture in the papers’ (13 January 2003). Hume was particularly concerned with the way in 
which police investigations into child pornography are ‘conducted through the media’. For 
Hume, such public declarations say much about ‘the sordid obsessions of contemporary 
culture’ and the ‘prevailing climate of prurient curiosity about child sexual abuse’. The 
public visibility of Inter-net child pornography and child sexual abuse ‘risks destroying the 
self-image of society’ (ibid.). On 15 January The Times in its editorial column argued that, 
although child sexual abuse is a serious crime, we should be wary of creating a ‘moral 
panic’. The editorial comment in the Daily Telegraph of the same day likewise dismissed 
any public disclosure of concern about Internet child por-nography: ‘[p]aedophilia is the 
bogeyman of the modern age’.  
 
The contrast between a series of distal and proximal relations across user, image, scene 
of abuse and ethical response helps frame the contours of this event (cf. Cooper & Law 
1995). The supposed closeness of the indecent photograph to the scene of abuse sets the 
tone of moral condemnation and call for action, just as the distance of image from abuse 
presages a more nonchalant response. But relations of closeness and distance are poor 
indicators of ethical responsiveness once we take into account the fact that all relations, 
however distal or proximal, are ‘mediated’; we cannot judge an image according to its 
mediation or, to put it another way, mediation cannot con-stitute the measure of an ethical 
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response, only the relations of it. In the following sections I investigate this in more detail 
in relation to a series of specific legal, psychological and media discourses.  
 
Legal discourses 
In both US and UK legislative discourse, over and above the medium of production 
(photography, .lm, computer imaging), the ontological status of that which is represented 
provides a major focus of concern. Thus the US Child Pornography Prevention Act 
(CPPA) of 1996 states:  
...‘child pornography’ means any visual depiction, including any photo-graph, .lm, video, picture, or 
computer or computer-generated image or picture, whether made or produced by electronic, 
mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit conduct, where –  
 
(A) the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct;  
 
(B) such visual depiction is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct;  
 
(C) such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to appear that an identifiable 
minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or  
 
(D) such visual depiction is advertised, promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a 
manner that conveys the impression that the material is or contains a visual depiction of a minor 
engaging in sexually explicit conduct. (2256 (8) 1996)  
 
On 16 April 2002 the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in response to an appeal 
by the Free Speech Coalition and others, held that statements 2256 (8) (B) and 2256 (8) 
(D), of the federal code as stated above, were ‘overbroad’ and ‘unconstitutional’.[6] The 
Court considered three lines of argument with regard to 2256 (8) (B). First, it stated that 
the CPPA was ‘inconsistent’ with the decision of an earlier case, Miller v. California (413 
US 15 1973): ‘[i]t extends to images that are not obscene under the Miller standard, which 
requires the Government to prove that the work in question, taken as a whole, appeals to 
the prurient interest, is patently offensive in light of commu-nity standards, and lacks 
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value’. Whereas the earlier ruling had 
construed the obscenity of an image in terms of a set of contextual factors, the CPPA, it 
was argued, would have allowed the possibility of prosecution on the basis of the image 
alone.  
 
Second, the Court stated that New York v. Ferber, an earlier trial that estab-lished 
precedent in this area, provided no support for the CPPA. The Ferber decision prohibited 
the production, distribution and sale of child pornography on the grounds that ‘these acts 
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were “intrinsically related” to the sexual abuse of children’. This earlier decision, in the 
Ferber case, was based on the fact that the child pornography was seen to be ‘a 
permanent record of a child’s abuse, the continued circulation itself would harm the child 
who had participated’ and, moreover, ‘because the traffic in child pornography was an 
economic motive for its production, the State had an interest in closing the distribution 
network’. The Court argued that ‘[u]nder either rationale, the speech had what the Court in 
effect held was a proximate link to the crime from which it came’. The Court thus stated 
that ‘[i]n contrast to the speech in Ferber, speech that is itself the record of sexual abuse, 
the CPPA prohibits speech that records no crime and creates no victims by its 
production’.[7] The proximity or distance of the speech (photograph) from the scene of 
sexual abuse (event) thus constitutes an important point in the legal understanding of child 
pornographic images.  
 
Third, the Court rejected the US Government’s argument in the CPPA that virtual child 
pornography may be used to seduce children. It stated that  
 
Virtual child pornography is not ‘intrinsically related’ to the sexual abuse of children. While the 
Government asserts that the images can lead to actual instances of child abuse, the causal link is 
contingent and indirect. The harm does not necessarily follow from the speech, but depends upon 
some unquantified potential for subsequent criminal acts.  
 
Thus, just as the court decided that virtual child pornography has no link to a crime of 
sexual abuse that has actually been committed, so too was the virtual image seen to have 
no necessary link to future cases of abuse (i.e. through groom-ing, through the effect of 
child pornographic images in creating child abusers, and so on). Moreover, as with adult 
pornography, virtual child pornography cannot be prohibited, it was argued, on the basis of 
its possible harm to some children or the possibility that some children may be exposed to 
it: the CPPA, it was stated, ‘runs afoul of the principle that speech within the rights of 
adults to hear may not be silenced completely in an attempt to shield children from it’.  
 
In contrast to the US, legislation in the UK is clear that ‘indecent pseudo-photographs of 
children’ as much as ‘indecent photographs of children’ constitute a crime. Part VII of the 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 simply inserts ‘or pseudo-photograph’ 
alongside ‘photograph’ in the relevant sections (chapter 37, subsections 2 and 3) of the 
Protection of Children Act of 1978.8 The Act defines a child as ‘a person under the age of 
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16’ and it defines a pseudo-photograph in the following manner:[9]  
 
(7) ‘Pseudo-photograph’ means an image, whether made by computer-graphics or otherwise 
howsoever, which appears to be a photograph.  
 
(8) If the impression conveyed by a pseudo-photograph is that the person shown is a child, the 
pseudo-photograph shall be treated for all purposes of this Act as showing a child and so shall a 
pseudo-photograph where the predominant impression conveyed is that the person shown is a 
child notwithstanding that some of the physical characteristics shown are those of an adult.  
 
(9) References to an indecent pseudo-photograph include – (a) a copy of an indecent pseudo-
photograph; and (b) data stored on a computer disc or by other electronic means which is capable 
of conversion into a pseudo-photograph.  
 
In UK legislation, the indecent photograph and the indecent pseudo-photograph are not 
identical but are treated as if identical. The crime of downloading child pornography is a 
virtual crime in the sense that irrespective of whether the downloaded images are records 
or not of actual abuse, they are treated as if they are so. The pseudo-photograph is 
constituted in the same terms as the photograph-as-document, even though its difference 
is marked. Both are deemed records of crimes, although in one case the crime is virtual, 
rather than actual.[10] If the legal status of the indecent photograph rests on it being a 
record of a real crime, then the indecent pseudo-photograph equally constitutes the record 
of a real crime. It is not a question of possibility. This is a crime that has occurred in a 
virtual space. Just as when a stick is placed half in water it appears to bend at the point 
between water and air, the pseudo-photograph is real. It has reference and extension. The 
virtual image of the submerged part of the stick has all the observable features of the stick 
once removed fully from the water, but when you place your hand in the water the stick is 
not where it appears. You cannot touch it where you see it. For UK legislation there is no 
dispute about the original and the counterfeit; both are defined through the criterion of the 
virtual image, of the simulacra.[11] As discussed in the previous section, the notion that all 
Internet child pornography documents a crime committed is one publicly adopted by law 
enforcement officers and child protection campaigners. Deputy Assistant Commissioner 
Carole Howlett, the Metropolitan Police head of child protection and spokesperson for the 
Association of Chief Police Officers on 351 Internet child abuse, has stated that: ‘[e]very 
sexual image of a child on that Internet is a child being physically and sexually abused 
and we cannot forget that’ (Guardian, 15 January 2003 ). But such an equivalence (i.e. all 
Internet child pornography ¼ images of actual child sexual abuse) is clearly problematic in 
a court of law. If doubt can be raised as to the evidential status of the image (as an image 
of actual child sexual abuse), then the question can be raised as to whether the image is 
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an image of child sexual abuse at all.[12] Both US and UK legislative discourse, in their 
different ways, avoid such a problem. In both jurisdictions there is a distinction between 
actual images of child sexual abuse and virtual ones. However, where the US is keen to 
constitute only the former as illegal, the UK sees both as illegal. Thus whereas the US 
Ninth Court of Appeal understood the image as one only in relation to the primacy (and 
primariness) of a presumed referent, the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994 
understands the image according to the image itself. The evidence is contained within the 
language of the image itself.[13] The image needs to appear to be a ‘photograph’ and 
hence needs to be encoded within the generic conventions of nineteenth-century realism. 
But also the form of observation presumes that the observer (as idealized in a court of 
law) is able to receive the ‘impression conveyed’ of a child (or rather a human figure with 
majority characteristics of those of a ‘child’ rather than an ‘adult’). The ‘photograph’ 
becomes the measure of the real and its observation. In this sense, the implicit 
prioritization in UK law of virtual child pornography means that the crime of possession, 
making or distribution of child pornography (whether virtual or not) is a crime not only 
against a particular child, but against all children. It is a crime against childhood as a 
universal.[14] 
 
Psychological expertise  
Images of child pornography are distributed via credit-card access websites, through 
bulletin boards and encrypted emails, and more recently through peer-to-peer .le sharing 
technologies (Jenkins 2001). These are not simply new ways of distributing child 
pornography but new configurations between producers, distributors and consumers, new 
forms of interaction between abusers and users, and new forms of abuse.[15] But despite 
the growing visibility of the scale and complexity of the problem, there is still relatively little 
research on Internet child pornography. Some of the most notable research comes out of 
the COPINE project based in the Department of Applied Psychology, University of Cork, 
under the directorship of Professor Max Taylor. I want to consider this research, not to 
offer a critique but to see how it shapes the problematic of Internet child pornography and 
how it differs from forms of articulation produced in legal discourse and, as we shall see in 
the following section, press reporting in the UK.  
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In an article entitled ‘Typology of paedophile picture collections’ (Taylor et al. 2001) a 
substantive argument is made that shifts understanding of Inter-net child pornography 
from a legal problem to a psychological one. Where in a legal framework the status of an 
image may be hazy – due to questions of national jurisdiction or to difficulties in attributing 
‘decency’ or ‘indecency’ – and hence pose a problem with regard to legal prosecution, in 
the context of psychological expertise – that considers not so much the status of the 
image but the relation between the collection of images and the user – the pathology of 
abuse is a universal. Taylor et al. argue that ‘an objective means of judging the nature of 
collections independent of legal provision would aid understanding and give a basis for 
international comparison’. More-over, they argue that ‘by emphasizing a psychological 
approach to pictures attractive to adults with a sexual interest in children, rather than 
pictures legally defined as obscene, we can identify a range of discernibly different kinds 
of pictures only some of which may be illegal’ (2001, p. 99).  
 
In order to construct a psychological account of the problem – and one that provides the 
ground for appropriate law enforcement and legal judgement across jurisdictions – Taylor 
et al. constitute the problem in broader terms than found in legal discourse. They draw on 
Kenneth Lanning’s behavioural analysis of child molesters (1992) for a distinction between 
child pornography and child erotica. Whereas the former is seen as explicitly sexual in 
terms of the content of the image, the latter may refer to any image that is used by an 
individual for sexual purposes: ‘[t]he significance of this distinction is to emphasize the 
potential sexual qualities of a whole range of kinds of photo-graphs (and other material as 
well) not all of which may meet obscenity criteria’ (Taylor et al. 2001, p. 97). The 
distinction between pornography and erotica – often used in the context of debates about 
adult pornography to distinguish between material with a sexual use and material with an 
aesthetic use – is now used to extend the range of concern predicated on the underlying 
personality of the individual user. But for Taylor et al., as for Lanning, the personality of 
the paedophile is disclosed not through direct investigation of the mind itself but through 
the manifestation of its motivated actions. It is the collection of images that provides 
symptomatic evidence of motivation and hence of the underlying personality. Thus, for 
example, supposedly innocent pictures of children may be read as ‘erotic’ and interpreted 
in the context of the collection as a whole.  
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Taylor et al.’s work on child sexual abuse and collections of child pornographic images 
builds upon, but also diverges from, earlier research that constructs the user of child 
pornography as a collector. Tim Tate in his research on child pornography states that: 
‘paedophiles don’t simply view the material they collect, they catalogue and index it as 
well’ (Tate 1990, p. 112 quoted in Quayle and Taylor 2002, p. 353). More systematically, 
Carl Goran Svedin and Kristina Back, in their research for the Swedish Save the Children 
charity (Svedin & Back 1996), have documented how users divide into different types of 
‘collector’: the ‘closet collector’ who looks at child pornography but has no direct 
involvement in child sexual abuse; the ‘isolated collector’ who collects images and is 
involved in child sexual abuse; the ‘cottage collector’ who shares his collection of images 
with others, is involved in child sexual abuse with other adults but is not interested in 
financial gain; and the ‘commercial collector’ who produces, copies, distributes and profits 
from sales and exploitation. These collectors are also differentiated according to varying 
degrees of organization: from, on the one hand, groups involving an adult leader, a 
number of children but no exchange of children or pornographic material to other adults; 
and, on the other, groups of adults, well structured (normally as syndicates), involved in 
systematic abuse and exploitation of children for profit (Svedin & Back 1996, pp. 16, 
20).[16] 
 
The collection is seen to be symptomatic of the pathology of the individual, but also to be 
indicative of a series of broader social relations mediated within online environments. 
Collections of Internet child pornography are seen to be collective endeavours. Trading, 
swapping and selling construct forms of market and gift relations and corresponding forms 
of sociality. Those engaged in such exchanges collect series of images and construct 
forms of community on the basis of possession or lack of images within particu-lar series 
(cf. Healy 1996; Svedin & Back 1996; Jenkins 2001; Quayle & Taylor 2002). For Taylor et 
al. collections ‘are not accidents’ but ‘result from deliberate choices by an individual to 
acquire sexual material’ (2001, p. 99).[17] The abusive image is the intentional outcome of 
the abusive personality: abusers make images of children abusive. But the abusive nature 
of the image and the pathological personality of the collector are only visible through the 
organization of the collection itself.  
 
Over and above the ways in which the collectors themselves might clas-sify the 
organization of their collections, Taylor et al. interpret the collection of pictures in terms of 
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a continuum ranging from ‘accidental pictures involving either no overt erotic content, or 
minimal content ... to pictures showing actual rape and penetration of a child, or other 
gross acts of obscenity’ (2002 , p. 100). The classification and ordering of typologies of 
images is not novel to COPINE research, but Taylor et al. have attempted to construct a 
scale that is indicative of the seriousness of motivation rather than the obscenity or 
indecency of the image per se.[18] COPINE’s 10-point scale (1. Indicative, 2. Nudist, 3. 
Erotica, 4. Posing, 5. Erotic Posing, 6. Explicit Erotic Posing, 7. Explicit Sexual Activity, 8. 
Assault, 9. Gross Assault, 10. Sadistic/Bestiality) is constructed not in terms of legal 
definitions of the ‘obscenity’ or ‘indecency’ of individual images but in terms of the 
com-bination of elements within the collection and of ‘a continuum of increased deliberate 
sexual victimization’.[19] Each image in a collection (inasmuch as it can only be 
interpreted in the structural context of the collection) is seen to constitute a form of 
victimization; the scale indicates the degree of victimization. Moreover, ‘the function of 
picture collections for the offender is to repeatedly victimize the child concerned, and the 
victim status is exaggerated by continuing use’ (Taylor et al. 2002 , p. 100). 
 
For Taylor et al. the sexual use of an image of a child constitutes a victi-mization of that 
individual. Picture collections, the size of which also indicate the degree of psychological 
motivation and seriousness, allow the user ‘instant access to the child (or a child) as 
victim’ (ibid.).[20] It makes little difference whether the image is an ‘actual photograph’ or a 
‘pseudo-photograph’; both represent forms of victimisation (ibid., p. 104). Other 
researchers have argued that there is a clear distinction between those who view and use 
child pornographic images and those who actually physically abuse children. Philip 
Jenkins, in his investigation of bulletin boards and newsgroups addressed to users of child 
pornography, makes a broad distinction between two types of user: those ‘who freely 
admit to being molesters, and those ‘who admit to being sexually excited by child porn 
images, but actually condemn actual contact’ (Jenkins, Guardian, 23 January 2003 ; see 
also Jenkins 2001). But for Taylor et al. there is no such distinction; the degree of 
pathology of the paedophile is measured in terms of the size and differential calculus of 
the collection, on the basis that such a virtual structure is actualized through its orientation 
toward the child as a virtual image: each time the catalogue is accessed, each time an 
image is used the virtual child is victimized.  
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Press reporting  
In the UK press coverage surrounding the Townshend case, the issue was presented 
across a series of problem spaces concerning both the degree of gratification in looking at 
child pornographic images and the level of connection between such looking and actual 
child sexual abuse. A series of verbal nouns – clicking, looking, using, downloading, 
possessing, collecting, making and distributing – help to shape our understanding of the 
relation between observation and crime, looking and abuse, accident and purpose, and 
innocence and responsibility.  
 
Firstly, at one end of the scale, an argument was made that looking at child pornography 
might induce a high level of gratification for some individ-uals but that this does not 
translate into actual abuse. In his once regular column for the Guardian, Rod Liddle stated 
that  
There is no causal link between viewing child porn and abusing children. And even if there were, it 
would not be suf.cient, within the philosophy of our juridical system, to simply assume that an 
unpleasant penchant for the former presupposes guilt of the latter. (Liddle 2003 )  
 
This was an argument rarely presented in the UK media. Much of the press most of the 
time made it clear that looking at child pornography in itself constituted a sufficient and 
punishable crime. As Mark Stephens, a lawyer who has advised the UK Internet Watch 
Foundation, stated: ‘it is wrong-headed, misguided and illegal to look at or download or 
even to pay to download paedophiliac material and if you do so, you are likely to go to 
prison’ (Guardian, 13 January 2003 ). 
 
Secondly, it was argued that those who look at child pornography are the same people 
that commit child sexual abuse: namely, that such gratificatory looking defines the 
psychology of the abuser, such that there is a clear correlation between the user of 
Internet child pornography and the child sexual abuser. Deputy Assistant Commissioner 
Howlett, of the Metropolitan Police, was quoted as saying that research on recent arrests 
in the USA for viewing or possessing child pornography has indicated that 30 per cent of 
those arrested had abused or were abusing children. In many press reports there was an 
assump-tion that those found in possession of child pornography are also child abusers.  
 
Third, gratificatory looking at Internet child pornography was con-structed not so much in 
terms of it being symptomatic of a pathology but of it being child abuse by proxy. As Shy 
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Keenan, spokeswoman for Phoenix Survivors group, wrote in an open letter to 
Townshend in The Times: ‘[t]he moment a person clicks that button, they may as well be 
molesting that child themselves’ (14 January 2003 ). Jenni Murray, in a letter to the 
Guardian Q1 critical of Rod Liddle’s piece, stated that: ‘[p]eople who look at such material 
for sexual gratification may well never progress to physical abuse, but the children in the 
photographs or films were abused on their behalf’. Similar to arguments more generally 
about ethical consumption, market relations are understood not in terms of the distance 
between buyer and seller, but in terms of their connectedness: ‘[w]here there is no 
demand there is no supply’ (15 January 2003 ). Q1  
 
Fourth, looking at Internet child pornography was constructed in terms of the absence of 
gratification, such that a disinterested observer witnesses abusive imagery in pursuit of 
knowledge. One ‘professional researcher’, Jan Rockett, in a letter to the Guardian, stated:  
Primary research ...cannot be based on ‘hearsay’ and relies on original, not reported, evidence. All 
good primary researchers trespass into dubious areas. Whether those areas are dubious in the 
academic, social, legal or intellectual sense is irrelevant. The purpose of research is to discover 
the truth and push the boundaries. (14 January 2003 )  
 
This is the argument put forward by Pete Townshend himself: ‘[i]t’s import-ant police are 
able to convince themselves that, if I did anything illegal, I did it purely for research’ (Sun, 
13 January 2003). But over the course of the reporting of the case, police officers, 
children’s charities, the Internet Watch Foundation and others reiterated the illegality of 
such looking. Bob McLachlan, ex-head of Scotland Yard’s paedophile unit, even declared 
in the Sun that the defence of ‘research’ was a ‘classic defence’ of the paedophile (13 
January 2003 ).  
 
This particular problem space helped not simply to signal the illegality of any form of 
looking at Internet child pornography, but to construct a distribution of legal and illegal 
forms of observation across a distinction between expert and layperson. Libby Purves, in 
The Times, argued that: ‘[n]obody has to click except police researchers, server censors, 
or the few serious pro-fessional experts on this wicked trade. Clicking out of curiosity, for a 
frisson, is prurience’ (14 January 2003 ). Purves states that if ‘laymen’ need to know about 
Internet child pornography, then they can go to ‘serious books’:  
 
That’s all we laymen need to know. It’s a crime. It happens. It has to be jumped on. The police, and 
a few lawyers with strong stomachs, need to see the pictures. The rest of us – including artists and 
writers – have no business with them. In any case, the reality of the event is not contained in the 
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fleshy pixels: it is locked inside the heads of the young victims. (ibid.) 
 
The distinction between expert and layperson is seen to constitute an import-ant boundary 
between abuser and witness. The expert, with little justification, takes the position of the 
non-abuser. As with the witnessing of scientific fact, those who do so first hand play a part 
in authoring and authorizing those ‘facts’, whereas those who congregate on the outskirts 
are only able to read those ‘facts’ second-hand. Suffice it to say that this division, 
inasmuch as it is layered over one between adult and child, has a longer genealogy in the 
troubled history of children’s legal testimony (cf. Smart 1989; Perry & Wrightsman 1991; 
Mortimer & Shepherd 1999).  
 
These discourses do not simply provide a space through which a public can become 
informed about new types of crime. They constitute specifically popular – as distinct from 
expert – problematizations and configurations of forms of observation. They provide 
popular spaces within which one’s relation to the specific crime of using, viewing, 
downloading, creating or distributing Internet child pornography can be orchestrated. The 
particular strengths or weaknesses of the gratification and connection between looking 
and abuse constitute particular configurations of proximal and distal but also necessary 
and contingent relationality.  
 
Concluding thoughts on ethics  
Across these sites – law, academic knowledge and the press – we see emerging a 
configuration of problems that are concerned with forms of virtual observation. These sites 
are not prescriptive and there are clearly other sites of problematization that might have 
been considered. Moreover, the forms of virtual observation are not consistent across 
these three sites. Each site has its own specificity that helps shape the nature of the 
formation. Across each of these sites the relations of virtual observation (distal/proximal, 
necessary/contingent, differential calculus/orientation) construct the problem of Internet 
child pornography as a problem about the referentiality of the image. In some formulations 
the virtual image refers to a scene of abuse that is real and our ethical response to this 
image is predicated on its reality, albeit a virtual reality. Although the evidential value of 
the virtual image is different from that of an actual image (and hence the forms of police 
investi-gation and legal prosecution are different), until an image can be said to 
cor-respond to an actual case of child sexual abuse all Internet child pornography can be 
 16
viewed as real. In this sense, the primary concern is not one of the effects of the image on 
others or one of the relations of power encoded in the image, but one of the virtual 
evidentiality of the image (i.e. on the image’s capacity to refer to an objective reality that is 
both internal and exter-nal to the image). The ethical intensity of the virtual image lies 
precisely in its capacity to refer to a scene beyond itself.  
 
Moreover, when the virtual image is taken seriously – when our ethical response is as if to 
a real crime of child sexual abuse – the image takes up the position of the ‘modest 
witness’ whose account of the scene is ‘unadorned, factual, compelling’ (Haraway 1997, 
p. 26; see also Shapin 1994). But the virtual photograph, as with the actual photograph, is 
not literally ‘obscene’ (i.e. standing in the way of the stage); rather it must take a position 
that is both endo-scenic and exo-scenic. The photograph must, in order to be ‘authentic’, 
be part of the scene that it records. It must be close to the scene, a necessary part of its 
development and constitutive of the scene. In this sense, the photograph, as endo-scenic, 
is performative (cf. Baudrillard 2000).[21] But the photograph must also be exo-scenic. In 
order for the photograph to circulate as evidence, to witness the event, it must stand 
outside the event itself. To act as a witness, to take on the authority of the witness as that 
which speaks for a silent other (cf. Agamben 1999), the photograph must take on a 
neutrality, an ethical distance. Hence the ambivalence of this constitutive moment. This is 
an ambivalence that is not novel to the virtual child pornographic photograph but one that 
has been discussed in detail in relation to the witnessing of the Shoah (cf. Felman 1992; 
Laub 1992a,b). The transition from living inside the concentration camp to witnessing 
outside is one that is deeply troubled, not least by the burden of truth: a truth that cannot 
be reduced to the ‘factual’. As Dori Laub states, there is a problem as to how one can 
remove oneself ‘sufficiently from the contaminating power of the event so as to remain a 
fully lucid, unaffected witness’ (Laub 1992b, p. 81; see also Campbell 2002).  
 
In all of this the child slips in and out of view. And despite the pull of a crude hermeneutic 
– for example, one which suggests that an ethics concerns one’s relation to the child and 
not to the image – the solution is even cruder: the ethics lies in our relation to the image 
itself. Nevertheless, our orientation to the image is becoming increasingly problematic. As 
the visibility of these crimes proliferates so too do the range of different forms of 
‘witnessing’ (legal, scientific, therapeutic) and the types of personnel assembled around 
these images (such as police investigators, psychiatric counsellors, lawyers, court 
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officials, those involved in child identification, computer experts, and so on). Cases are 
ordered; photographs are classified and placed in collections; images are used in the 
contexts of professional practice. The forms of observation are discrete and rarefied. 
Professional observations take place in bounded, exclusionary spaces and only certain 
actors are allowed to enter. These forms mirror the pathology under investigation. But, 
unlike the pathologized forms of observation discussed in the above sections, these 
practices of investigation, legal trial, research and therapy are not explicitly codified and 
open to public scrutiny. This is surprising given that child sexual abusers have historically 
taken advantage of the veils of secrecy that forms of authority might permit.[22]  
 
Notes  
1 The Greater Manchester Police has argued for the use of the phrase ‘images of child sexual abuse’, rather 
than ‘child pornography’, as the former is seen to be a more accurate denominator of the state of affairs 
depicted, given that the images ‘depict rape and other forms of child abuse’ (Carr 2003, p. 29). In the article I 
use both phrases as it is clear from the research that images which, in the context examined in this article, 
are viewed as ‘child pornography’ are not only images of abuse but also images of children in their daily 
activities that in other contexts could easily be viewed as innocuous and innocent (cf. Taylor et al. 2001).  
 
2 As downloading Internet child pornography creates a copy of the image, it is interpreted as ‘making’ rather 
than simply possessing.  
 
3 The Sexual Offences Act (2003) provides the defences of ‘legitimate reason’ accordingly: if it was 
necessary for a person ‘to make the photograph or pseudo-photograph for the purposes of the prevention, 
detection or inves-tigation of crime, or for the purposes of criminal proceedings, in any part of the world’; or if 
the person was a member of the Security Service or GCHQ, and it was necessary for them to make the 
photograph or pseudo-photograph for the exercise of any of the functions of the Service or GCHQ.  
 
4  Although legislation curbing the production and distribution of child por-nography was introduced in 
various European countries and in the US in the late 1970s and early 1980s, it was not until the early 1990s 
that posses-sion of child pornography was made illegal. Possession of child pornography was made illegal 
in Norway in 1992, in Germany, France and Canada in 1993, Austria in 1994 and Denmark and Belgium in 
1995. In the UK pos-session of child pornography was made illegal in 1988 (cf. Svedin & Back 1996).  
 
5  The term ‘spectator’ carries the connotations of passivity, whereas the term ‘observer’, from its Latin 
etymology, refers not simply to perception, but also to the ‘following of rules’ (cf. Crary 1992). However, 
observare also means ‘to keep with’, ‘to watch over’, ‘to protect’, and ‘to examine’. In this sense, it carries 
some of the ambivalences that are encoded within the problematic of forms of ‘looking’ at indecent 
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photographs of children.  
 
6  The Court also stated that 2256 (8) (D) was overbroad and that it invited juries to assess material ‘in 
light of the manner in which it is promoted’: ‘[e]ven if a .lm contains no sexually explicit scenes involving 
minors, it could be treated as child pornography if the title and trailers convey the impression that such 
scenes will be found in the movie. The determination turns on how the speech is presented, not on what is 
depicted.’ Moreover, the Court argued that the CPPA: ‘bans possession of material pandered as child 
pornography by someone earlier in the distribution chain, as well as a sexually explicit .lm that contains no 
youthful actors but has been packaged to suggest a prohibited movie. Possession is a crime even when the 
posses-sor knows the movie was mislabeled.’  
 
7 In addition, the US Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit stated that a photographic image of a real event 
could not be treated the same as a com-puter-generated (or virtual) image of an event. It was argued that if 
both images were identical, then commercial organizations distributing child pornography would distribute 
virtual images, not real ones: ‘[i]f virtual images were identical to illegal child pornography, the illegal images 
would be driven from the market by the indistinguishable substitutes. Few porno-graphers would risk 
prosecution by abusing real children if .ctional, com-puterized images would suf.ce.’  
 
8  See also section 160 of Criminal Justice Act, 1988.  
 
9  The US, for example, de.nes a child, in this context, as under 18 years.  
 
10  In some respects, the pseudo-photograph corresponds with Deleuze’s understanding of the virtual, 
‘The virtual is fully real in so far as it is virtual’ (Deleuze 1994, p. 208). The virtual is not opposed to the real 
but to the actual. Thus virtual crimes are not possible ones; they are real but not actualized. In other 
respects, though, what I am attempting to describe differs from Deleuze’s account.  
 
11  Although UK legislation is framed according to the ‘impression conveyed’, it gives no guidance on 
how to understand such an ‘impression’. I imagine that most child pornography traded and exchanged on 
the Internet is framed within the conventions of photographic and cinematic realism, but the 1994 Act makes 
no attempt to foreground or privilege particular aesthetic codi-.cations over others (i.e. avant-garde or 
realist). The Act simply refers to the conveying of an impression of an act, not to the manner of that 
convey-ance. It is for the individual court to consider whether the manner of conveyance (i.e. the aesthetic 
form taken) facilitates the conveyance of an impression of an act of abuse. Would a court decide that a 
virtual montage of child pornography conveyed an impression of child sexual abuse? Does animated child 
pornography constitute an offence?  
 
12  Given the low numbers of actual children actually identi.ed from Internet child pornographic images, 
there is a risk in presenting such an equivalence as grounds for legal argument. Notwithstanding this, there 
is also the ques-tion as to whether in construing such an equivalence there might be a mis-allocation of law 
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enforcement resources. In this sense, although images of child sexual abuse should, if found, form part of 
an investigation of actual child sexual abuse, it might be more appropriate to treat Internet child pornography 
as a distinct and separate phenomenon. It is clearly related to child sexual abuse but it has its own 
singularity and speci.city.  
 
13  Unlike the realist photograph whose veridicality can be judged according to its correspondence to 
the referent, no such epistemological splitting occurs with the virtual image. The referent is in the image.  
 
14  Each image of a child being sexually abused is an image of all children. The qualities of ‘childness’ 
in the image are constituted with reference to ‘childness’ beyond the particular child in the image (i.e. to a 
series of uni-versal qualities, albeit ones that are open to social and historical change).  
 
15  Nevertheless, the physical location of abuse is still to a large extent the home and the relation 
between abuser and abused is still to a large extent familial. In a very real sense, these technologies of 
abuse are ‘domestic’ technologies, despite being globalized.  
 
16  A major concern of law enforcement agencies is the extent to which the  latter form of commercial 
organization is growing and becoming dominant as a consequence of either lack of political will, inadequate 
legislation, poor policing or a combination of these factors within national jurisdictions (e.g. the US) and 
across particular regions of the globe (e.g. Southeast Asia and the former Soviet Union).   
 
17  This typology of the abuser as collector contrasts with some popular  conceptions of accidental 
downloading of Internet child pornography.   
 
18  Taylor et al. make reference to the PICS (Platform for Internet Content Selection) and RSACi 
(Recreational Software Advisory Council) rating schemes and to a tripartite typology used by ‘investigative 
agencies’ that divide images into: (1) Indicative – material depicting clothed children, which suggests a 
sexual interest in children; (2) Indecent – material depicting naked children which suggests a sexual interest 
in children; (3) Obscene – material which depicts children in explicit sexual acts (Taylor et al.2002 ,p.98).  
Q5   
 
19  The Court of Appeal in November 2002 drew on a modi.ed scheme from the Sentencing Advisory Panel 
that was itself based on the COPINE scale: (1) images depicting erotic posing with no sexual activity; (2) 
sexual activity between children or solo masturbation; (3) non-penetrative sexual activity involving an adult; 
(4) penetrative activity with an adult; (5) sadism or bestiality (quoted in Carr 2003, p. 14). The Court of 
Appeal also indicated that the degree of seriousness of the offence increased with regard to the proximity to, 
and responsibility for, the original abuse and that simple downloading constituted a lesser offence than wide-
scale commercial distribution (Carr 2003, p. 14). However, unlike COPINE the Sentencing Advisory Panel 
clearly differentiates between ‘indecent photographs’ and ‘indecent pseudo-photographs’, such that 
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possession of the latter constitutes a lesser offence punishable by a .ne.   
 
20  Taylor et al. do, somewhat contradictorily, distinguish between victimization through the use of images 
and actual abuse inasmuch as the former is seen to avoid ‘complex and lengthy engagements’ (Taylor et al. 
2002, p. 100; see also O’Connell 2003).   
 
21  Baudrillard argues that: ‘[t]hrough photography, it is perhaps the world itself that starts to act (qui passe 
a` l’acte) and imposes its .ction. Photography brings the world into action (acts out the world, is the world’s 
act) and the world steps into the photographic act (acts out photography, is photography’s act)’ (2000 ).  Q4   
 
22  It is important to imagine the child abuser not simply according to the stereotypical images of 1920s and 
1930s public man (the school teacher, the scout leader, the sports coach and so on) or the image of the 
‘bad’ father, uncle, grandfather of the 1980s, but to move beyond the critique of past good to an interrogation 
of present good men and women. As Nietzsche says: ‘That which an age feels to be evil is usually an 
untimely after-echo of that which was formerly felt to be good – the atavism of an older ideal’ (1966, p. 190).   
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